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TRIAL AND ERROR: EXAMINING ERISA § 514(a)
PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYER "FAIR SHARE"
LAWS IN THE AFTERMATH OF GOLDEN GATE
RESTA URANTASSOCIA TION v. CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO
DANIEL RANELLONE t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Healthcare is one of the most valued benefits available to
the American employee, and remains one of the United States'
most pressing domestic issues. Notwithstanding the elderly,
eighteen percent - 46 million - of this country's citizens are
uninsured, and four-fifths of that total consists of individuals
coming from working families.' Based on the surveys taken for the
past several years, 700,000 more children
were uninsured when
2
studied in 2007 than in previous studies.
The federal government and the states have differed in their
approaches to solving this enormous problem, which has led to a
variety of different proposals offered. To varying degrees, the
federal government, most recently led by former Congressional
leaders Dennis Hastert and Bill Frist, has embraced the individual
or privatization method, in conjunction with considerable public
coverage for seniors and low-income individuals. The most recent
" J.D., 2008, University at Buffalo Law School. I would like to thank Professor

James Wooten for contributing his comments and suggestions throughout the
research process, and for creating and maintaining the ERISA curriculum which
sparked my interest in this case and in this most "complex and reticulated" of
subjects. I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support; my life
would look quite different without their love and encouragement. Last, but
certainly not least, I would like to thank the Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
staff. Their edits and dedication made this a more focused, and Bluebookfriendly, document. Errors and omissions rest solely with the author.
See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 4-5, 9

(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-04.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Edwin Park, CBO Estimates to Show SCHIP Agreement Would
Provide Health Insurance to 3.8 Million Uninsured Children, CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.cbpp.org/9-25-

07health2.htm# ftn2.
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effort promoting private coverage came in the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Modernization, and Improvement Act, when
Health Savings Accounts ("HSAs") were created as a means of
providing tax breaks to encourage citizens to obtain and pay for
their own high-deductible health plans. 3 States have gone a
different route, seeking to provide their own plans to cover a
broader range of low-income and uninsured citizens than
conventional Medicaid programs. 4 Many state proposals require
contributions by local employers, either through providing a set of
health coverage plans or by contributing a specified sum on behalf
of the number of individuals employed. These contributions
generally serve to assist in covering both uninsured employees and
the state's poorest and unemployed citizens.
The provision of health care is generally considered an area
where state governments have substantial influence, one of the
areas in which Justice Brandeis encouraged states to act as
"laboratories" of experiment. 5 Answering this call, states and
municipalities like Maryland, Massachusetts, Hawaii, California,
Suffolk County, NY, and San Francisco have stepped forward with
proposals to ensure that their citizens are guaranteed health care.
However, these states and localities have often encountered
difficulty in implementing these proposals due to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 6 ERISA has
been interpreted to prohibit states from regulating plans that "relate
to" employee "welfare" plans, which includes nearly any
employer-offered benefit outside of the scope of defined pension
plans. One of the first benefits contained in the definition of
"welfare plan" is, of course, health benefits. As a result, states have
3 See 26 U.S.C.
4 For example,

§ 223 et seq. (West 2006) (Health Savings Accounts).
there have been a number of recent state efforts to expand
coverage for children under SCHIP. See, e.g., Doug Trapp, States Sue Federal
Government Over Tighter SCHIP Limits, AMEDNEWS, Oct. 22/29, 2007,

http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007 /10 /22/gvsclO22.htm.
5 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
629 U.S.C. § 1001 etseq.
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been taken to court for their proposals to require employers to
assist them in providing coverage to their citizens, and have
usually lost.
This paper seeks to examine the reasons that state
legislative efforts have failed, will delve into who "won" and will
offer an explanation as to why they won, and will offer some
predictions as to what may happen if the Supreme Court decides to
get involved. Finally, this paper will explore the merits of the state
plans, exploring the desirability of these proposals.
II.

ERISA § 514(a) LITIGATION: QUASHING
STATE
EFFORTS
TO
REQUIRE
EMPLOYERS TO SUPPORT OR PROVIDE
HEALTH COVERAGE
A. Legislative
Developments
ERISA's Preemption Clauses

Leading

to

ERISA represents a legislative compromise between the
House and Senate, social reformers and labor organizations and
employers, and a variety of other competing interests. A prominent
symbol of this compromise is reflected in ERISA's preemption
provisions, which were broadly written so as to appease corporate
and labor groups who were concerned about states passing
subsequent, more restrictive laws with which they would have to
comply. 7 Senator Jacob Javits, an early and "impassioned"
supporter of national health insurance, 8 was aware that broad
preemption provisions requested in conference committee
discussions could jeopardize many state efforts that related to
provision of health care, but decided to concede the broad
preemption in exchange for more regulatory influence by the U.S.
7 See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT

OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 217, 282 (2004).
8

ERISA Pre-emption and Health Care Reform: A History Lesson, (Employee

Benefit Research Institute, Washington, D.C.), May 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI Notes 05-2007.pdf.
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Department of Labor ("DOL") (and thus, his Senate Labor
Committee). 9 Senator Javits seemed to believe (or hope) that the
federal courts' development of "a body of Federal substantive law
. . . to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under

private welfare and pension plans" would somehow modify the
broad preemption Congress had laid out for welfare plans - the
thought seemed to be that the courts would refuse to interpret
preemption as broadly as it had been written. With the exception
of a few cases in the mid-1990s, however, ERISA preemption has
been read to provide quite broad preemption.
B. "A body of Federal substantive law" ERISA § 514(a) Litigation"
Senator Javits's hope was fulfilled, to the extent that a
voluminous body of federal substantive law was created from
ERISA litigation. However, neither American politics nor ERISA
preemption policy provided the opening for implementation of the
universal healthcare that he was hoping for. The main obstacle to
state approaches to providing universal healthcare has proven to be
ERISA § 514(a), whose history should be explained before the
actual healthcare cases are addressed.

9 See WOOTEN, supra note 7, at 217.

10Id. at 282 (quoting ERISA Leg. History 4771

Senate Committee on Labor

and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974: Public Law 93-406,
(Washington: GPO, 1976)).

9 4 th

Cong., 2d sess., Committee Print

" Professor Edward Zelinsky has written extensively on § 514(a) preemption,
which includes published law review articles on both the Maryland and the
Massachusetts health care plans. See, e.g., The New Massachusetts Health Law:
Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 229 (2007)
[hereinafter Massachusetts Law]; Maryland's "Wal-Mart" Act: Policy and
Preemption, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 847 (2006) [hereinafter Wal-Mart]. I have
relied on his articles, and on the knowledge gained from a Pensions and
Employee Benefits course, to guide me in this discussion of pertinent litigation.
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1. Brief Discussion on ERISA Litigation
a. ERISA § 514(a) Preemption

ERISA § 514(a) provides that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefits plan."' 12 Further, § 102 defines an "employee
welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, fund or program which.., was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, [or]
disability ....
13 Thus, laws that regulate healthcare and other
employee welfare benefits are preempted by ERISA, if they "relate
to" an employee benefits plan.
b. "Relate to" Clause
One of the earliest cases to interpret § 514(a) was Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,14 which involved a case where New York
State had passed a human rights law that mandated employers to
provide pregnancy disability benefits to their employees. 5 The
Supreme Court, interpreting "relate to" to include any state laws
which had "a connection with or reference to" ERISA pension and
welfare plans, struck down the New York law as "related to"
employer ERISA welfare plans. 16 By requiring employers to act in
a nondiscriminatory way toward pregnant individuals in providing
benefits, New York State was imposing additional burdens upon
employers' ERISA plans that ERISA had not done. Such an
additional burden on administration and funding of employer
welfare plans is connected with or related to the employer's
U.S.C. § 1144(a).
U.S.C. § 1002(1).
14 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
12 29
13 29

1"Id. at 92, 97.
16See id. at 100.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXVII

ERISA plan, and imposing additional requirements violates ERISA
§ 514(a). The standard set, that any law having a "connection
with" or "reference to" an ERISA plan is preempted, would be
refined with time.
Another key case in the Shaw line was Districtof Columbia
v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,17 which concerned a D.C.
law that required employers maintaining healthcare coverage for
their employees to provide equivalent coverage for injured
employees who were eligible for workers' compensation
payments.1 8 The Court found that such a plan was prohibited by §
514(a) regardless of whether it was specifically designed to affect
ERISA plans or if its effects were only indirect, and further found
that a state law is preempted even if it is "consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements."' 19 Washing Board of Trade is key in that
it is a case where a common "rate" or "standard" was set (as20with
the "fair share" acts to be discussed), but was still preempted.
The Court acknowledged the difficulty of its "relate to"
interpretation in N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,2 1 conceding that "for all
practical purposes preemption would never run its course," if
"relate to" was "taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy. " 22 In Travelers, the Court determined that it would
now look to the purpose of ERISA preemption to ensure that the
"historic police powers of the States" were not superseded unless
clear Congressional intent was shown, 23 and nothing in ERISA
17

506 U.S. 125 (1992).

18 Id.

at 126-27; see Wal-Mart, supra note 11, at 851-52.
19 Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 129-30 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
20

Professor Zelinsky sees the Washington D.C. plan as one that "refers to"

employee welfare plans, whereas the employer healthcare laws actually refer to
and regulate welfare plans by requiring reporting, contributions, et cetera. WalMart, supra note 11, at 853.
21

N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.

Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
22

Id. at 655.

23

id.

2008-2009

Trial and Error.ERISA Preemption

indicates that Congress "chose to displace general health care
regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern." 24 But, Travelers was based on a state surcharge to the
insurance payor, not to the employer. 25 The Court viewed the
surcharge as an "indirect economic influence" 26on a choice of
coverage, not on the ERISA plan or administrator.
The Court continued this line of logic the next year in
CaliforniaDivision of Labor StandardsEnforcement v. Dillingham
Construction N.A., Inc.,2 7 concluding that California's wage law
did not relate to an ERISA plan.2 8 In this instance, the Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement required that apprentices be paid
certain statutory wages; Dillingham sued, saying this interfered
with its administration of an ERISA plan. 29 The blanket
requirement on employers, though, did not refer to or connect with
ERISA0 plans so as to disrupt the uniform administration of the
3
plans.
In 2001, the Court revisited preemption in Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff3' overturning a Washington law that revoked probate
designations of former spouses as beneficiaries, finding that it
governed "the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan
administration." 32 This is a crucial post-Travelers ruling, as it
reiterated that plans cannot be forced into providing benefits to
specific individuals, this effectively governs plan administration
(an area that ERISA certainly relates to).

Id. at 661 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S.
707, 719 (1985)).
25 Wal-Mart, supra note 11, at 859.
24

26

[d.

27 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc.,
519
U.S. 316 (1997).
28
1d. at 319.
29
[d. at 321-22.
30 See id. at 332-34.
31 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
32 Id. at 143, 148.
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2. Universal Healthcare Litigation
a. The Maryland Plan - "Fair Share

Health Care" Part I
i.

Background

On January 12, 2005, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act ("Maryland Act"). 3
The Maryland Act was directed at non-governmental employers of
10,000 or more state citizens, requiring that companies included in
the definition devote at least 8% of their payroll expenditures
toward health insurance, or that they pay the difference to the
Labor Secretary. 34 For non-profit employers, the number to meet is
6%. The Maryland Act also required employers to provide annual
reports of its total number of employees, the amount spent on
health insurance costs, and the percentage of the payroll that the
figure represented. 36 The Maryland Act further defined "health
insurance costs" as health care expenditures "to the extent the costs
37
may be deductible by an employer under federal tax law."
Crucially, only four employers met the definition provided in the
Maryland Act, and three of them were exempted from having to
modify their current procedures. 8 Only Wal-Mart remained; they
sued for summary judgment, through the Retail Industry Leaders
39
Association ("RILA"), shortly after passage of the Maryland Act.
James Fielder, Maryland Secretary of Labor, Licensing, and

33 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101 (West 2005); Retail Industry

Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (D. MD. 2006).
34 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-102, -103(a)(1), -104(b).

35Id. at § 8.5-104(a).
36[d. at § 8.5-103.
37 Id.at § 8.5-101(d)(1) (apparently meaning HSA or some other includible
employee expense).
38 Fielder,435 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
39
Id.at 484.
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Regulation, cross-moved for summary judgment through the
40
Maryland Attorney General's Office.
ii. District Court Decision
(a) Jurisdictional Arguments
The first matter for District Judge Motz 4 1 to rule on was
Maryland's motion to dismiss based on a challenge of RILA's

standing to bring the case. 4 2 Judge Motz dispatched the standing
argument, finding that RILA has "associational standing" as an
advocate for the rights of members of its group. 43 Also important
to the case was the finding that Wal-Mart and RILA were
subjected to an "actual or threatened injury" by the Maryland
legislation. 44 In order to find this, the judge found that the
reporting requirements, even though "trivial," were an additional
40

Id

41 Judge J. Frederick Motz was appointed to the district court by President

Reagan in 1985, having served as United States Attorney for the District of
Maryland during President Reagan's first term; he also served as an Assistant
United States Attorney for President Nixon from 1969-71. Maryland District
Court, Judge Fredrick Motz, http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/publications/
JudgesBio/motz.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
42 Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485. To this reader, the standing ruling was
a
crucial one. Since RILA is a business group, rather than an actual business being
directly affected, the standing argument could have permitted the judge to avoid
ruling on this case on the merits. Further, a favorable ruling for the State here
would have shown one possible technique for avoiding statutory challenges; it
would have forced Wal-Mart to bring the case as a named party, rather than by
using the resources and name of RILA from which to go after these laws. Also,
this would have permitted deeper discovery of Wal-Mart's expenses and
practices.
1 Id at 485-86. The Supreme Court's ruling in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), requires 1) that one of the association's
individual members have standing; 2) that the interests the association is trying
to protect are "germane to the organization's purpose;" and 3) the claim asserted
and relief requested do not require the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
44 Fielder,435 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
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burden; additionally, the court found that Wal-Mart would be
administratively and economically burdened by the 8%
requirement. 45 Without this finding, there would be no foundation
from which to argue the ERISA case thereafter.
(b) The "Payroll Tax" Argument
The next argument that the attorney general made was that
the Maryland Act was imposing a "payroll tax," which would
bring it under the Tax Injunction Act, removing the district court's46
jurisdiction and placing it under state court supervision.
However, the district court judge determined that his jurisdiction
was appropriate here, as he found the Maryland Act's fee to be
"regulatory," which would fall outside of the Tax Injunction Act. 47
Factors to consider here in determining whether a fee is
"regulatory" rather than a "tax" includes "1) what entity imposes
the charge; 2) what population is subject to the charge; and 3) what
48
purposes are served by the use of the monies from the charge."
Looking at the narrow focus of the Maryland Act on one business
rather than all citizens, that it is operated by the Maryland Labor
Department, an agency, and that its purpose is largely based on
encouraging employers to provide health care to employees (rather
than actually to collect the fees to raise revenue), the court found
49
that the Maryland Act imposed a regulatory fee rather than a tax.
(c) Section 514(a)
The court then turned to the ERISA preemption issue. The
court first explained how § 514(a) preempts any and all states that
relate to a benefit plan, emphasizing that courts must look to the
45 Id.
46

[d. at 490.
47 Id. at 490-93.

Id. at 491 (quoting Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th
Cir.
2000)).
49
Se id. at 490-93.
48
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"objectives" of ERISA and to "the nature of the effect of the state
law on ERISA plans." 50 The "main objective" of ERISA
preemption is to prevent a "multiplicity of regulation," which
justifies the prohibition of related state laws. 5 1 The court then
actually uses New York City's and Suffolk County's employer
contribution laws against Maryland's, contending that these
different laws already show that there are differing statutes with
which employers will have to deal. 52 The other factor illustrating
"connection with" an ERISA plan is that Wal-Mart's health plan is
defined as an ERISA plan, and the Maryland Act's effect is to
"force" Wal-Mart to increase health care contributions,
which
53
plan.
its
altering
into
Wal-Mart
"coerc[ing]"
be
would
The court disagreed with Maryland's interpretation of
Travelers and Dillingham, who read the cases as narrowing ERISA
preemption and adopting a "pragmatic approach;" instead, the
court held that these cases lie at the "periphery" of ERISA
analysis, while mandates on "employee benefit structures or their
administration" lie at the core of ERISA preemption. 54 Unlike
Travelers and Dillingham, which involved a surcharge for
hospitals and economic incentives for apprentices (considered
"tangentially related"), Judge 5 5Motz found that the Maryland Act
"focused upon" ERISA plans.
As to the alternatives to the 8% contribution, the court
noted that the HSAs would only fall outside the definition of
ERISA plans if voluntarily entered into; that spending 8% or more
on providing on-site first aid facilities "demeans the seriousness"
50

Id. at 494.

51id.
52 Id. There were also laws pending in Oklahoma and Minnesota. See id. at 494-

95. However, the Court distinguishes these laws simply by the different

employer contribution percentages required, belying the soundness of the
argument. If the only difference is that some states require 10% contributions
(Minnesota) while others like Maryland want 8%, how burdensome on an
ERISA plan is that really going to be?
51Id.at 495. This satisfies the "connection with" factor of § 514(a).
54 id.

51Id. at 496.
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of the Maryland General Assembly; lastly, the court again found
that the choice between paying 8% of 56
payroll or providing its own
all.
at
choice
a
really
not
was
coverage
(d) Equal Protection
Interestingly, the court moved on to RILA's argument that
the Maryland Act violated the Equal Protection Clause after its
ruling on preemption.5 7 While the court pointed out the Maryland
Act's lack of clear distinctions and classifications, it nonetheless
upheld the validity of the law, granting the legislature "leeway to
approach a perceived problem incrementally." ' 58 Wal-Mart also
made the argument that there was an equal protection violation
because it was the only legal person affected by the Act, but the
court found that Wal-Mart would have to show itself to be a
"politically vulnerable" group in order to receive protection from a
59
law that specifically targeted it.
iii. The Fourth Circuit's Decision

Secretary Fielder and the State appealed the decision to the
6
Fourth Circuit, who affirmed the district court's opinion entirely. 0
Writing for a 2-1 majority, Judge Niemeyer 6 1 affirmed the district
56
57

58

Id.at 497.
Id.at 498.

Id. at 500 (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 308

(1993)).

59 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).

60 With the exception of RILA's equal protection claim, which it did not reach

after finding that the Fair Share Act was preempted. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n
v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2007).

61Judge Paul V. Niemeyer was appointed in 1990 by President Bush,; Judge
William Byrd Traxler, Jr., the second judge in the majority, was appointed by
President Clinton in 1998, after being appointed to the South Carolina District
Court by President Bush in 1991. See generally United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, Judges, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 11,

2009).
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court's finding that RILA had "associational standing" to challenge
the Act, affirmed that the case was ripe for review, that it was not a
"tax" and thus barred from federal court review by the Tax
Injunction Act, and that the Maryland Act was preempted by
62
ERISA.
(a) Some Interesting Points
For the most part, Secretary Fielder and RILA made
essentially the same arguments, to which the Fourth Circuit
responded similarly. However, the Fourth Circuit did have a few
new approaches to address some of the arguments made. As to the
argument that the jurisdiction triggered by the Tax Injunction Act
should be used, Maryland pointed to the stated purpose of the Act,
which was to "support the operations of the [Maryland Medicaid]
Program." 63 This stated purpose illustrated that the plan for the Act
was to generate revenue, as a tax would, for Medicaid.64 However,
the Fourth Circuit found this to be a "superficial characterization,"
deducing that the Maryland Act's "content" and "context" show its
"actual" purpose.65
Maryland also characterized the Act as "part of [its]
comprehensive scheme for planning, providing, and financing
66
health care for its citizens," rather than as an employer mandate.
This was simply a payroll tax that offered employers a credit
against any taxation for healthcare spending. 67 But the Fourth
Circuit refused to interpret the Maryland Act this way, looking to
the expansive scope of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)'s definition of an
"employee welfare benefit plan," which includes any "plan, fund
62

Fielder,475 F.3d at 189, 197.
at 189. This will be contrasted with the San Francisco plan infra p. 81.

63 Id.
64

This argument, about the creation of a "fund" to illustrate that a tax is being

imposed rather than a regulatory fee, is one that will continue to arise in these
cases.
65

Fielder, 475 F.3d at 189. Both courts saw this as a legislative attempt to

regulate Wal-Mart's provision of health coverage to its employees.
66

Id. at 190.

67 id.
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or program" consisting of "medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits," of which any state laws that "relate to" those plans are
preempted by § 514(a).6 8
Looking to the intent of ERISA and the Act, the court
conceded that Dillingham recognizes that ERISA is not presumed
to "supplant state law, especially in cases involving 'fields of
traditional state regulation' . . . [such as] the regulation of matters
of health and safety," 69 but distinguished this case from the
Dillingham line of cases by pointing out that those were about
healthcare "providers," not about employers.7 Nor is a state law
that regulates the administration or structuring of an ERISA plan
saved by an "opt out" provision, because it still requires employers
to modify their plans or tailor them to the state's intended goal.y l
The court then reiterated the importance of ensuring administrative
2
7
uniformity of ERISA plans.
When looking at the alternatives to direct payment to the

State's fund, the court made another interesting finding. It said it

"would still conclude" that the Maryland Act had an impermissible

relation to ERISA plans, even if the on-site medical clinics and
contributions to HSAs were meaningful alternatives. 73 The "vast

majority of any employer's healthcare spending occurs through
ERISA plans," so attempts to comply with the Act would always
affect ERISA plans.7 4 This is a crucial discussion as it seems to
preclude the possibility of presenting any sort of employer

healthcare contributions legislation as a potential alternative.

68

at 190-91.
Id. at 191 (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995)).
70
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 192 (citing Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001)).
72
[d. at 193.
7, Id. at 196.
7
1d.

69

4

id.
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(b) Judge Michael's Dissent
Judge Michael 75 cited the "explosive growth in the cost of
Medicaid," and explored the scope of the problem for most of his
dissenting opinion. 76 After agreeing that the case was justiciable
and that it was outside of the jurisdiction of the Tax Injunction Act,
77
he then went on to dissent from the ERISA preemption holding.
Judge Michael emphasized the importance of state experimentation
in that the Maryland Act was "a legitimate response to
congressional expectations that states develop creative ways to
deal with the Medicaid funding problem." 78 He then discussed the
"incidental impact" of simple record-keeping requirements, 79 and
further considered the payments a legal requirement that were
"easily satisfied through means unconnected to ERISA
plans ...,,80
b. The Suffolk County Plan - "Public

Health Cost Rates"
i.

Background

In October 2005, Suffolk County, NY passed the Fair Share
for Health Care Act ("Suffolk County Act"), requiring large retail
stores selling groceries to make "health care expenditures" of at
least $3 per hour worked for their Suffolk County employees. 81 If
employers did not provide the appropriate expenditures, they
would be subjected to civil penalties by Suffolk County and have
75 Judge

M. Blane Michael was appointed by President Clinton in 1993. See
generally United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra note 61.
76 Fielder,475 F.3d at 198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
77 Id.at 201.
78
79

0

Id.
[d. at 202.

' Id. at 203.
81 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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82
to make up the shortfall in county health care spending.
Employers were also required to file health care expenditure
reports, payroll records that included names, addresses, and job
titles, and the dates and hours worked of each employee during the
reporting period. 83 The Suffolk County Act also exempted covered
employers who had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") with a labor union. 84 Again, RILA stepped in through
Wal-Mart (this time in Suffolk County) and filed a complaint
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Suffolk County Act on
preemption grounds, saying that it only imposed requirements on
employers 85who declined to enter collective bargaining
agreements.
Suffolk County amended the Act, replacing the $3 per
employee requirement with a more general "public health cost
rate, ' 86 removing the exemption for employers who had entered
into a CBA, and removed the requirement that made employers
make up the spending shortfall if they failed to provide health care
expenditures. 87 To provide some expenditure options for
employers, the Suffolk County Act allows employers to provide
1) health savings account contributions on behalf of employees;
2) reimbursement of employee health care expenses; 3) an
employer operated workplace "health clinic;" or 4) employer
contributions to a federally qualified health center. 88 Like
Maryland, Suffolk County appeared to be targeting Wal-Mart,
defining the Act's "covered employer" as a large grocery retailer in
which 25,000 plus square feet are used in selling groceries, or a
store of 100,000 square feet or more and uses at least 3% of its
floor space on grocery sales, or it generates $1 billion or more of

82

Id.

83 Id.
84

[d.

85

Id.

16

Id.The rate would be set by the Suffolk Department of Labor. Id.
Id. The amended version preserved the civil penalties provision. Id.

17
88

Id.at 407.
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revenues with groceries constituting 20% of that revenue.89
Further, the Suffolk County legislators expressly mentioned the
deleterious effect of "Wal-Mart type" stores on communities, 90 and
the drastic increases in Medicaid 91costs after the introduction of
Wal-Mart stores into communities.
ii. The Eastern District's Decision

Both RILA and Suffolk County filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, with the main dispute resting on whether or
not the Act is preempted by ERISA. 92 This became a high-profile
case, with RILA being represented by prominent ERISA firm
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, and Suffolk County being
assisted by intervenors like the City of New York and a variety of
social welfare groups, who were represented by Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP and Meyer, Suozzi, English and Klein,
P.C., respectively. 93 The arguments were similar to the Maryland
decision, with the business plaintiffs prevailing again. The eastern
district relied mainly upon the "reference to" language and case
law of ERISA § 514(a), and upon the goal of a "uniform
administrative scheme" in finding that states and municipalities are
89

Id.

90

Id. at 408.

91 Id
92

Id.at 409.

93 Gibson Dunn has been involved in a number of pivotal ERISA cases,

including its representation of RILA in the Maryland case (by Justice Scalia's
son, nonetheless). Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 182 (4th
Cir. 2007). Cleary Gottlieb is a 900 plus person internationally renowned firm.
Cleary Gottlieb, http://www.cgsh.com/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 13,

2009). Meyer Suozzi is one of New York State's most powerful lobbying and
labor law firms. Tom Suozzi - the Nassau County Executive and a former
gubernatorial candidate - is represented at the firm by his father, who is a named
partner, as is current governor David Paterson, whose father, Basil, is also a
prominent partner with the firm. Governor Paterson's father was also Deputy
Mayor of New York City and was Secretary of State for New York. Meyer
Suozzi
is especially influential
on Long Island.
Meyer Suozzi,
http://www.msek.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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prohibited from regulating ERISA plans. 94 Further, the court relied
heavily on the Maryland District Court and Fourth Circuit
decisions. 95 Like the Maryland Court, the eastern district found
that the alternatives provided were not sincere options, but rather
that the choice was between paying the municipality more money

or simply paying more for their employees directly. 96 The court did
not see this as a choice, but rather as a mandate that employers

restructure their ERISA plans, a preempted activity under § 514.
Looking at each "option," the court found as to each
alternative offered: 1) HSAs would relate to plans because they
were not voluntarily provided; 2) on-site health services are
"unrealistic" and "impractical" for employers; 97 3) direct
contributions to a health center would be less favorable than
simply paying that money toward providing a different welfare
plan themselves; and 4) setting up an employee reimbursement
plan would require employers to establish a new ERISA plan to
ensure proper administration of expenditures.9 8 Crucially, the court
found that the Suffolk County Act requires companies to change
"how they structure their employee benefit plans." 99 In other
words, the Suffolk County Act puts employers in an ERISAviolative bind.

94 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (citing

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
See id. at 413-16.

95
96

See id. at 416-17.

97 Interestingly, the notion of "fast food" or "in-and-out" healthcare was not so

burdensome as to prevent Wal-Mart from implementing it for paying customers.
See infra p.95 and note 182.
98 See Retail Indus. LeadersAss'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18.
99 Id. at 418 (quoting Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197
(4th Cir. 2007)).
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c. The San Francisco Plan
i.

Background

In 2006, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
unanimously passed the San Francisco Health Care Security
Ordinance ("San Francisco Act"), which was signed by Mayor
Gavin Newsom. 100 The San Francisco Act, both similar to and
different from past efforts to promote universal healthcare,
deserves exploration.
The San Francisco Act requires medium and large
businesses to make required quarterly health care expenditures on
behalf of covered employees, based on the total number of hours
the employee has worked for the San Francisco employer. 1 1 The
Act also requires employers to maintain accurate records of
healthcare expenditures, allow the City of San Francisco
"reasonable access" to those records (though the records do not
have to be in a particular form); if the employers do not provide
those records, though, the city is merely allowed to examine them
102
through the San Francisco Tax Collector and Treasurer's Office.
This implies that the records are not expected to be something
outside of the ordinary course of business, which is important.
They are, however, subject to administrative penalties for failure to
comply with the San Francisco Act. 103 The Act also provides a
"non-exclusive" list of healthcare expenditures that qualify,
including: 1) employer-funded HSAs; 2) employer reimbursement
to employees; 3) payments to third parties for employee coverage
(insurance); 4) direct delivery of healthcare to employees; and 5)
payments to the city on behalf of covered employees. 104 The "non100 Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F. Supp.

2d 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
101S.F. ADMIN CODE § 14.3(a).
102
Id. at § 14.3(b).
103 Id. at § 14.4(e).
10 4

Id. at § 14.1(b)(7).
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exclusive" description, and the more extensive list of options,
shows that the Act is not as binding as its predecessors.
Further, San Francisco set up the Health Access Program
(also known as "Healthy San Francisco") to provide healthcare to
its uninsured citizens, whether employed or unemployed. 10 5
Healthy San Francisco is significant in that it not only provides
coverage for the uninsured, tying the San Francisco Act to
universal coverage, but it also provides a program for collecting
and administering funds. Having a city-operated program to
manage things ensures a minimal burden to employers, should they
choose to make expenditures to San Francisco, since they are
essentially limited to writing a check that they would already track
in the regular course of business. Healthy San Francisco was
designed to be funded by both employer contributions through the
San Francisco Act and through other city resources.106
Other important prongs of the legislation include its
"preemption" section, which declares that it should not be
interpreted to conflict with state or federal law,10 7 its "severability"
section that separates each section in case one is deemed
unconstitutional,' 0 8 and its "general welfare" section that declares
the San Francisco Act to be designed 1for
satisfying its "obligations
9
to provide health care" to its citizens. 0
On November 8, 2006, the Golden Gate Restaurant
Association ("Golden Gate") brought a suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against San Francisco, contending that the San
Francisco Act was preempted by ERISA.110
10' Id.

at §§ 14.1(b)(6), 14.2(c)-(f). Unlike Maryland and Suffolk County, NY,

which express their desire to restore Medicaid expenditures (and possibly exact
some retribution on companies it perceives to be cheating), San Francisco is
striving to show that it wants the funding for healthcare, not repayment.
106 Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F. Supp.
2d 968, 970-71 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
107 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.6.
" 8 Id. at § 14.5.
"o9 Id. at § 14.7. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
110Golden Gate Rest., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 971. San Francisco cross-motioned for

summary judgment. Id.
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ii. District Court Decision
Judge Jeffrey S. White11 1 published his opinion on
December 26, 2007, after the case had been brought before his
court in the northern district of California. 1 12 Judge White began
by outlining the requirements of the law, discussing the medium
and large employers covered under the program, the listed forms of
accepted expenditures, the design of the Healthy San Francisco
program, and the recordkeeping requirements and penalties.113
Judge White then discussed the case's fitness for summary
judgment, and proceeded to go into the intent of § 514(a)
preemption. 114 The discussion resembled the analyses from
previous cases going through Shaw and the uniform administration
of ERISA plans rationale for exclusive federal control, the broad
definition of employee welfare plans, and the "relate to"
language. 115
Judge White then found that the San Francisco Act was
preempted because it was impermissibly connected with employee
welfare plans by "mandating employee health benefit structures
and administration," which interferes with employer autonomy and
uniform administration of plans. 116 Further, the San Francisco
Act's provisions refer to plans, are designed to act immediately
upon plans, and cannot operate successfully without the existence
of welfare plans. 117 Among the factors that the court cited in
finding the impermissible connection, it looked at whether the state
law regulates the types of benefits of the plans; whether the law
requires the establishment of separate plans; whether the law

.. Nominated by President Bush in 2002. Judges of the United States Court,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid2973 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
112 Golden Gate Rest., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
11
3 Id. at 970-71.
114

See id. at 972-75.

115 Id.

116

Id. at 975.

117

Id.
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imposes reporting requirements; and whether the law regulated
ERISA relationships (like the one between the plan and the
employer). 118 The court found that the San Francisco Act fulfilled
all of these factors aside from actually requiring the creation of a
plan - the Act directly regulates the level of benefits the plans
should provide; the Act's recordkeeping requirements are ongoing
and directly affect the administrative scheme; and the Act alters the
relationship between ERISA plan providers and their
beneficiaries. 1 9 The court also found that the San Francisco Act
makes specific reference to ERISA plans in §14.1(b)(7) by
providing specific types of employer-provided plans (which fall
under the "welfare benefit plan" definition of ERISA). 2 ° Further,
the court distinguished the San Francisco Act from a California
regulation of wages statute, which required employer
contributions, by pointing out that it did not require the provision
of any types of benefits to employees, but merely required
employers to provide a minimum level of compensation. 12 1 A
minimum wage statute does not refer to ERISA plans because it
does not dictate that an employer provide benefits, nor does it
require benefits plans to be
altered - any changes in plans would
122
choice.
employer's
the
be
In its conclusion, the district court describes the legislative
goal as "laudable," but said that it "is not convinced" that "other
alternatives for creating a program for providing public health care
are not viable."' 123 The court then expresses its desire to avoid
"wading into the legislative dominion," but says it can "envision" a
tax program that "takes existing health care expenditures by
private employers into account in the form of tax credits," or just
118

Id. (citing Operating Eng'rs Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ

Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998)).
119 Id. at 975-78.
120 Id. at
121Id. at

978.
979 (citing WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 791, 796 (9th Cir.

1996)).
122

Id.

123 Id. at

980.
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requiring an "hourly rate" paid to the city. 124 The district court then
25
grants Golden Gate's summary judgment motion. 1

iii. Ninth Circuit Reversal
On December 27, 2007, San Francisco then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, making a motion to stay the district court's
judgment so that it could implement the San Francisco Act, which
had been set to go into effect on January 1, 2008. 126 Judges
127
Goodwin and Reinhardt concurred28 in Judge Fletcher's opinion,
which granted the motion to stay. 1
In order for a court to grant a stay of judgment, it must
evaluate the applicant's motion on the following factors:
1) whether the applicant has made a showing that s/he is likely to
succeed on the merits; 2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured if the stay is not granted; 3) whether the other parties will
be substantially injured by granting the stay; and 4) where the
public interest lies. 129 Also, the court reviews the previous decision

124

Id.

125 id.

126

Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d

1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). The City actually made the motion to both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit. Id at 1115. The motion was denied by the
district court on December 28. Id.
127 Judge Arthur Theodore Goodwin was appointed by President Nixon
in 1971;
Judge Stephen Reinhardt was appointed by President Carter in 1980; and Judge
William A. Fletcher was appointed by President Clinton in 1998. See Judges of
the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009). San Francisco was represented by Altschuler Berzon, a West
Coast labor law powerhouse. Id. at 1114. Also, the spouse of one of the firm's
named partners is Marsha S. Berzon - a judge on the Ninth Circuit and a lawyer
at Alschuler from 1978-2000. Judges of the United States Courts,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid 2856 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
12' Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d at
1114. Oral argument for the case on the merits was heard on April 17, 2008
See infra p. 92 and note 170.
129 See Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco,512
F.3d
at 1115.
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de novo.130 Concluding that San Francisco has a "strong
likelihood" of success that it would be injured more gravely than
Golden Gate, and that the public interest is promoted by the Act,
the Ninth Circuit panel granted San Francisco's stay motion. 131
After discussing the standard required to grant the stay, it
explains why it deserves to be granted, beginning with a discussion
of the San Francisco Act. 132 The court explains the rates for
different sized employers, goes into the variety of non-exclusive
options, and differentiates between the types of employers under
the Act.133 There are those with no ERISA plans, those that have
plans that spend at least as much as is required by the Act for
employees, those that spend enough for some employees but not
others, those that have plans but do not spend enough, and those
that have plans for some but do not spend the Act-approved
amount. 134 This discussion is important because all of these
employers are guided by the San Francisco Act, yet none are
required to make the plans or change their plans. 135 Further, the
Act requires that the employer make136"payments" to a plan or the
city, not that they provide "benefits."'
(a) No "Connection with"
The court then delves into ERISA preemption, discussing
its purpose of providing a uniform regulatory scheme for
employers with ERISA plans. 137 The court concludes that the San
Francisco Act does not require adoption or alteration of ERISA
plans because of the option to make health care expenditures, and
0

13

Id. at 1116.
1127.

131Id. at
132
13

Id. at 1117.
at 1118.
Id. at 1118-19.

3 Id.
134

Id. at 1119. Again, though, this is simply a matter of interpretation by the
judges. The Maryland and Eastern District courts likely would have affirmed the
lower court's ruling.
135

136 Id.

137

Id. at 11 19-20.
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further does not affect the "administrative practices" of the benefit
plan because the employer would "voluntarily elect to change [its]
practices."' 13 8 The court sees the use of a surcharge as analogous to
Travelers, whose use of a surcharge to "influence" insurance
139
purchasers (including employers) was "entirely permissible."'
This was deemed an "indirect economic influence," and the Ninth
Circuit found that the Act was "even more indirect" than
Travelers.14 Whereas in Travelers the fee would presumably lead
to insurance providers having to alter their coverage to cope with
the new surcharge, the effect of the San Francisco would be an
employer deciding to spend money on a plan rather than sending it
directly to the city fund. 141 The Act does not require that employers
provide certain
benefits or that it provide any benefits
42
whatsoever. 1
(b) No "Reference to"
In determining whether a law has an illegal "reference to"
ERISA plans, the court asks whether the law acts "immediately
and exclusively upon ERISA plans" and whether "the existence of
ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation."' 143 The San
Francisco Act does not "single out" or "specifically mention"
ERISA plans - the court holds that the Act does not act on ERISA

138Id. at 1121. This is a very different interpretation than the Fourth Circuit

took. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. It is also interesting that the
Ninth Circuit does not address the other RILA cases; while it is not required to
address another circuit's rulings, perhaps it will offer a rebuttal to those
decisions when the case is decided on the merits.
139 Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d
at
1122.
140

Id.

141See
142

id.

Id. (citing Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.

Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 960 (3d Cir. 1994)).
143Id. at 1123 (citing Cal. Div. of Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
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plans at all.144 Though the district court had found the Act to be
similar to Greater Washington in "mandating employee health
benefit structures," the Ninth Circuit distinguishes the two by
observing that Greater Washington involved a plan that required a
specific level of benefits to be matched in accordance with an
ERISA plan for other employees - the present San Francisco Act
makes no such reference to levels of payments or benefits provided
by an ERISA plan. 145 Instead, this case is similar to the city
requiring a standard payment for employees, as in WSB Electric.,
Inc. v. Curry,14 6 the minimum wage law. 147 For these reasons, the
court finds the city to148
be likely to prevail on the argument that its
law is not preempted.
The court then discusses the hardships likely to be
experienced by the parties, and finds that the approximately 20,000
uninsured San Franciscans will be more severely injured by not
receiving health coverage than will the businesses, which may
have to make one quarterly payment and may have to face
preliminary administrative burdens. 149 Further, the public interest
prong again rests with provision of healthcare over businesses
saving money.15 0 For these above reasons, the court grants San
Francisco's motion to stay judgment.151

144

145

Id.
Id. at 1124.

146 WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1996).
147 Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d. at

1124-25.

148 See id. at 1125.

149 Id at 1125-26. Interestingly, the Court finds that the intervenors, who include
workers unions and insurance rights groups, are the ones whose injuries will
include human suffering - as opposed to San Francisco and Golden Gate, whose
injuries are economic. Id. at 1126.
150Id. at 1126-27.
151Id. at 1127.
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THE PLANS AND THEIR DIFFERENCES

Though the Ninth Circuit seems to view the employer
requirements' impact on ERISA plans differently than the other
courts who have ruled so far, there are some differences in the
plans that deserve discussion.
A. Maryland's Wal-Mart Plan
As Professor Zelinsky observes, the Maryland Act is "illconceived."' 152 Targeted at Wal-Mart in a less than subtle manner,
the Maryland Act would generate revenue from only one company
even if it had been upheld, and likely would have caused Maryland
Wal-Marts to simply reduce their number of employees or raise
153
prices to account for the new expenses of the Maryland Act.
Rather than addressing their Medicaid concerns by trying to ensure
that all mid- or large-sized firms provided healthcare or adequate
expenditures for their employees, instead Maryland simply
attacked one very large firm by limiting its legislation to employers
of 10,000 or more. The San Francisco Act adopts the opposite
approach.
Another aspect that caused preemption was the
administrative burden imposed. Whereas San Francisco asked for
"reasonable" access to records and only asked for information that
154
it could obtain on its own through the company's tax returns,
Maryland required the "principal executive officer" to provide a
signed annual report informing the Maryland Labor Secretary of
the number of employees and percentage of payroll spent on
healthcare for the preceding year. 155 Further, the executive officer
had to include an affidavit, which would subject him to penalty of
perjury, with the report. 156 The next section differentiates payments
152

Wal-Mart, supra note 11, at 847.

153 Id.

154S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b).
155 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-103(a).
156 , _
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1 7
for non-profits from payments required by for-profit companies, 5
further illustrating the special treatment reserved for Wal-Mart. As
Professor Zelinsky points out, the Wal-Mart
law is a "poorly158
designed exercise in political symbolism."'

B. Suffolk County Plan
The Suffolk County Fair Share for Health Care Act is
similar to Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Fund Act with a few
variations. First, the Suffolk County Act has a page-long
discussion of its legislative intent, discussing the lack of healthcare
coverage for low-wage employees, the low wages offered by the
retail industry, and the rapidly rising Medicaid costs. 159 The
Suffolk County Act then goes on to define the covered employers,
which includes large grocers and food retailers. 16 Among the
amendments made to the Suffolk County Act after the first RILA
lawsuit was changing the standard $3 per hour payment to a
requirement that a "public health cost" rate be paid instead. 161 This
amendment unmasks any claim that the Suffolk County Act was
designed as a revenue generating fee, rather than an effort to
require employers to fund their employees' healthcare, as the rate
is to be set at what the Suffolk Labor Secretary desires for "public
health." Further, it represents an administrative burden, as
companies will have to follow these different rates every year
when they are released by the DOL. Additionally, the reporting
requirements imposed require the employer to inform Suffolk of
157 Id. at § 8.5-104.
158 Wal-Mart, supra note 11, at 893.
159

SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAW § 325-1 (2005).

160 Id. at § 325-2. Again, the size required for the stores - including grocery
stores of 25,000 or more square feet, stores that derive at least 3% of revenue
from a 100,000 square foot selling space, or a company with $1 billion or more
in revenue that derives at least 20% from food sales - is geared toward a huge
establishment like Wal-Mart. See id.
161 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). This public health cost rate is set by the Suffolk Department of
Labor. Id.
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their previous year's healthcare expenditures, payroll records with
each employee's personal information, and the amount of time
each employee has worked. 162 The district court found this to be
enough of a burden to interfere with ERISA's goal of ensuring a
uniform administrative scheme. 163 The reporting requirements are
similar to San Francisco's, though the San Francisco Act provides
a secondary option for getting the information through records
already provided to the Office of Labor Standards Enforcement by
companies, if the employer does not provide it. 164 But, the
similarities in these plans illustrate the courts' different
interpretations of these respective laws.
C. Massachusetts Plan
One recent healthcare law that has not yet been discussed in
this paper, because there has been no litigation pursued against it,
is the Massachusetts Health Law. 165 The Massachusetts law, a
reflection of political compromise, combines a number of different
features, including an individual mandate for all citizens to procure
healthcare, an employer pay-or-play mandate, heavy regulation of
insurance providers to ensure non-discrimination, the creation of a
fund for management of employer contributions, subsidies for
individuals unable to afford healthcare, and a "connector" designed
to bring individuals together so as to pool their risks and save
money on insurance. 166 This law would seem to infringe upon
ERISA plans both by mandating the plans of individuals and by

162 SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAW § 325-3.

163
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass 'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 416-18.
164 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b).
165 Several

theories have been posited for the absence of litigation in this case.

Professor Zelinsky brings up what may be the most likely reason, which is that
the Massachusetts health law is a genuine example of a compromise, a product
of bipartisan cooperation and labor and employer involvement. See
MassachusettsLaw, supra note 11, at 282.
166 Encompasses a number of sections, including MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149 §
188(a) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 176Q (2006).
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mandating employers' plans. 167 However, it may be saved as a
result of the compromises made in putting the law together;
perhaps the most important aspect of this is the $295 "bargain"
surcharge imposed upon employers who do not provide coverage
for their employees. 168 Further, Massachusetts's definition of
"affordability" for healthcare plans will determine how much of
the population will be covered by the State itself, relieving the
burden from individuals and other parties. 169 This law is very
different from the other plans, mandating coverage for all people,
not just requiring expenditures by employers, but the law is too
early in the implementation process to know what chances of
success it will have.
IV.

CONCLUSION: PREDICTIONS AND
POLICIES
A. The Current Status of Golden Gate
Restaurant

San Francisco's case was argued on the merits before the
same panel that granted the stay on April 17, 2008.170 When the
case was originally heard, this author speculated that the Ninth
Circuit would likely affirm its logic from the stay motion.
Interestingly (but inconclusively), Justice Anthony Kennedy
denied Golden Gate's motion to vacate the Ninth Circuit's granting
of the motion to stay. As the Groom Law Group speculated in a
comprehensive public memorandum to clients, 171 the likely
resolution occurred with Golden Gate losing the appeal to the same
167 MassachusettsLaw, supra note 11, at 233-34.
168
169

See infra p. 98 and note 190.
See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Symposium, Failureto Connect: The Massachusetts

Plan for Individual Health Insurance, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1283, 1288-89
(2007).
170 Golden Gate Restaurant Association, Employer Mandated Health Care,
http://www.ggra.org/Information.aspx?ID-60 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
171See Groom Law Group, Fair Share Laws, http://www.groom.com/documents/
FairShareLaws ERISA PreemptionFINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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judges who heard the stay motion. 172 Golden Gate then filed for an
173
en banc hearing by a larger portion of the Ninth Circuit.
However, despite the circuit conflict issues lurking, the Ninth
Circuit refused to hear the case en banc. 174 In refusing to hear
before a full court, Judge Fletcher stated:
In brief, the Ordinance requires San Francisco employers to
pay to the City of San Francisco what amounts to a tax. The
tax is either $1.17 or $1.76 per hour per employee,
depending on the profit or non-profit status of the employer
and the number of employees. No employer is required by
the Ordinance either to establish a new ERISA health care
plan or to modify an existing ERISA health care plan. An
employer may fully satisfy its obligation
under the
75
1
City.
the
to
tax
the
paying
Ordinance by
Given the increasing passage of similar bills and
subsequent litigation, and the potential circuit split that could arise
between two powerful circuits, the Supreme Court may decide the
time has arrived to set a uniform precedent.
B. The Likely Result
Golden Gate Restaurant drew in a number of powerful
parties as intervenors and as amici, including the Service
Employees International Union ("SEIU") (intervenors), the United
States Chamber of Commerce, the DOL, the ERISA Industry
Committee, the American Association of Retired People
("AARP"), and the California Attorney General's Office
172See Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d

639 (9th Cir. 2008).
173See Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 0717370, 2009 WL 605320 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
174Id. at*1.

175 Id.

This interpretation of these proposals states, simply, the approach
articulated in the stay motion and in the appeal ruling.
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("California OAG"). 176 With the exception of the SEIU, AARP,
and the California OAG, the overwhelming number of amici and
intervenors support Golden Gate's position in favor of
preemption. 177 Further, a variety of influential blogs by law
professors support Golden Gate's arguments. 17 8 It seems that the
only way the Supreme Court would uphold the San Francisco Act
would be through a substantial expansion of the Travelers
surcharge theory to include employers, and a narrowing of what
legislative activity is connected with ERISA plans. Neither of these
seem likely, given the Court's rulings in cases like Egelhoff that
have come after Travelers.
C. Policy Suggestions/Critiques
1. Professor Zelinsky
Professor Zelinsky yet again provides a wealth of ideas, in
addition to criticizing some of the current approaches to handling
the healthcare problem. Professor Zelinsky is especially critical of
the notion of "taxing" big businesses, especially when they cater to
poorer consumers like Wal-Mart.1 79 To him, the increased costs for
Wal-Mart's healthcare expenditures will simply cause them to
raise prices and/or lay off their low-income workers.1 80 As an
alternative, Professor Zelinsky proposes that states increase their
176

Golden Gate Restaurant Association, Information, http://www.ggra.org/

lnformation.aspx?lD-60 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
177 See generally id.
178

See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Golden Gate Restaurant Association:

Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption in the Ninth Circuit (Feb. 5, 2008)

(unpublished
comment),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id 1090122); Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/laborprof blog/2008/02/zelinsky-on-gol.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2009) (citing their approval of the Zelinsky analysis); Health Plan Law blog,
http://healthplanlaw.com/?p-546 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009) (citing their
approval of Zelinsky).
179

See, e.g., Wal-Mart, supra note II at 888-89.

180 , -

2008-2009

Trial and Error.ERISA Preemption

Earned Income Tax Credits ("EITC") to low-income taxpayers as a
means of providing them with additional resources to invest in
healthcare.1l s In addition, states can provide tax credits for
taxpayer investments in 401(k) plans and individual retirement
accounts that can incentivize planning for these expenses.
These ideas expose a fundamental disagreement about
paying for healthcare. Whereas Professor Zelinsky seems to
believe that individuals should be encouraged to save on their own
by adding yet more incentives to the tax code, this author finds it
reasonable for a state to respond to its drastically increasing
Medicaid burden by taxing the employers who are coming into the
state and encouraging its employees to use those state resources.
States and municipalities are providing huge tax breaks to
companies for coming into their jurisdictions; perhaps those (often
wealthy) companies can share the burden that they are creating
when they employ low-wage workers and then fail to cover those
workers' healthcare expenses, rather than leaving low-income
laborers to fend for themselves or rely on Medicaid. 1 2 Further, are
these really the jobs that we want people to cling to, in fear of layoffs because the company does not want to pay for the healthcare
that its employees are being provided by the state? As was
discussed earlier, most of the nation's uninsured are employed, but
simply cannot pay the high costs of healthcare; what quantity of
tax credits would be required to enable them to pay for healthcare
for themselves and their families? Would it make sense to provide
these tax credits, or just use the money on administering a broader,
uniform system that will ensure coverage instead?
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Professor Zelinsky also proposes that states be exempted
from preemption for experimentation purposes. 8 3 Section
514(a)(5)'s exemption of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act
provides precedent for taking such a maneuver, and Professor
Zelinsky encourages that Congress either amend ERISA to exempt
the bipartisan Massachusetts Health Law, or that it consider
exempting all state efforts at healthcare reform.1 4 Depending on
the intentions of the new Obama Administration and the new
Congress, ERISA legislation and public health coverage may be in
store for dramatic changes,18 5 rendering this entire line of argument
moot, but until then ERISA exemption for state experimentation
remains an intriguing idea.
An argument that would almost certainly be raised in
opposition to legislative exemption would be a familiar one, and
one that will come up if a "fair share" case reaches the Supreme
Court - ERISA's purpose of ensuring a uniform administrative
scheme. Perhaps the argument that best illustrates the lack of
administrative burden by a "fair share" statute - which requires a
percentage of healthcare expenditures and reporting requirements
that only ask for records which would be kept in the regular course
of business - is the employer's own conduct. Many of the
employers affected have already taken on the burden associated
with operating businesses under different laws in different states
and countries; employers are able to comply with different general
insurance rates and taxation rates and different regulatory
environments in different countries. Employers choose to enter

183 See
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MassachusettsLaw, supra note 11, at 280-84.
See id. at 281-83.
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new jurisdictions for the purpose of making more money, 8 6 and
choose to comply with their respective laws; what difference does
the requirement of another percentage of their payroll make?
2. Other Policies/Critiques
Among the other options (aside from the government
providing healthcare without the assistance of employers), are new
taxes or regulations on insurance or multiple employer welfare
arrangements, 1 7 and what may be called the nuclear option
allowing cities to ban "discount superstores" from their
jurisdiction, as occurred in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of
Turlock.188 One other option would be to expand programs like
Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Program to
include greater income ranges, so as to expand coverage. 19
Imposing new taxes or regulations through § 514
exceptions would be likely to injure those already covered by
insurance, as healthcare providers and insurers would probably just
raise prices and detract from plan coverage as a means of
recouping lost expenditures. As to the nuclear option, all parties
(other than local employers) seem to be injured. Big employers
186
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cannot expand their businesses, and municipalities cannot derive
the benefits of those businesses being there. Instead of not getting
adequate revenues or expenditures, they do not receive any.
Among some other options, the National Academy for
State Health Policy mainly echoes Professor Zelinsky and the
strategies already attempted: it encourages fair share statutes; tax
credits to employers and/or employees for investing or saving for
healthcare; increasing the prevalence of "public works" contracts
through which employer-provided healthcare can be mandated (the
Dillingham rule); state creation of purchasing pools to bring
together individuals so rates can be lowered; and Travelers-style
taxes on providers/insurers. 190 All of these remaining options again
place the burden on the states; they will presumably be forced to
increase taxes in order to fund future tax credits, education
projects, public works projects, and so on.
3. Do we really want fair share laws?
The remaining policy question is whether fair share laws
will actually do any good. Will employers start providing
healthcare? Will they simply shift their new costs onto consumers
and employees? How easy will implementation of these plans be?
If Massachusetts is a harbinger for the remainder of the
plans, the University of Kansas does not paint an encouraging
portrait. First, the Massachusetts plan "promises," but "does not
guarantee or directly provide" universal coverage to Massachusetts
residents. 19 1 Further, the Massachusetts plan only requires that
employers pay $295 for each employee that they refuse to give
coverage to, a "bargain rather than a penalty."' 192 In other words,
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PreemptionManualfor State Health Policy Makers, Jan. 2000, 47-53.
191 Weeks, supra note 169, at 1285. See generally Monisha Bansal,
Massachusetts Healthcare Plan Costs Skyrocket, CNS News website, Jan. 25,
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192Weeks, supra note 169, at 1287.
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the employer makes money by paying the expenditures.' 93 These
incentives point toward individuals being penalized for failure to
obtain coverage when they may not be able to afford it, and toward
encouraging businesses to abandon their healthcare plans to
increase their profits.
Plans are still in the implementation and challenge phases,
so one cannot be sure as to how things will play out. But if state
experimentation produces perverse incentives to drop coverage
plans while ERISA induces towns and cities to bar entry to certain
employers, it certainly would not be what Senator Javits
envisioned in 1974.

193 This bargain gives the employer very little reason to challenge the statute

under ERISA. Id. at 1287-88.

